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Abstract. We develop a price maker/taker model to study how a fi-
nancial transaction tax affects markets where potential traders either
take a price or quote prices for the next potential trader. We find taxes
widen quoted and effective spreads by many times the tax; reduce vol-
ume, gains from quoting, and gains from trade; may decrease volatil-
ity slightly without market makers; increase volatility significantly with
market makers; and, do not eliminate destabilizing speculators. These
effects are amplified in markets with market makers. We find revenue-
optimal rates of 55–70 basis points but that the socially-optimal tax
would be zero. JEL: C72, D44, G19
Keywords: transaction tax, Tobin tax, market microstructure, limit or-
der model, market makers, high-frequency trading, search costs
The taxation of financial transactions is a topic of perennial interest to
regulators. Supporters of such a tax claim it would deter harmful speculation
and raise significant tax revenues. Opponents of a transaction tax argue
it would lead to reduced liquidity and make trading too costly for some
investors. We model a price maker/taker market and then study how a
transaction tax affects that market. This model gives economists a new
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tool to assess these claims and consider the effects of enacting, changing, or
repealing a transaction tax. The model also yields insights into the effects
of transaction taxes on markets with market makers (intermediaries). Since
investors and intermediaries compete for liquidity, this work is especially
relevant for markets with high-frequency traders or thin liquidity.1
Many supporters of a tax cite Tobin’s (1974) proposal of a 1% tax on for-
eign exchange transactions to reduce short-term speculation post-Bretton
Woods.2 He hoped to “throw sand in the wheels of the market” by discour-
aging noise-creating speculation. This strategy was designed to achieve a
policy objective: allowing nations greater leeway in exchange rate policies
and in staving off monetary crises. While supporters of a broad-based se-
curities transaction tax include politicians such as US Representative Peter
DeFazio, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Franc¸ois
Hollande, they also include other economists such as Larry Summers and
Keynes (1936).3 A common view among supporters is that most short-term
financial transactions are made by speculators causing excessive volatility
in the financial markets.4
Opponents argue that a Tobin-like transaction tax would increase price
volatility due to reduced trading volume and increased bid-ask spreads.
They also claim that it would increase price volatility and the cost of capital
while decreasing security values.
1“Thin” liquidity means that there is little depth and the size of the inside bid-ask quotes
are small.
2This idea was reiterated and expounded upon in Tobin (1978) and Tobin (1984).
3A broad-based tax is one that would be levied on all financial securities such as stocks,
bonds, options and futures with only government securities exempt. Keynes was an aca-
demic, but he also advised on policy.
4The October 1987 market crash, the 6 May 2010 “flash crash,” and the recent financial
crisis are often cited as examples cum outcomes of harmful speculation.
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We believe that our model is an innovative tool that can inform policy
makers about the ramifications of transaction taxes. The model helps ex-
plain previously-observed effects of taxes, some of which have been puzzling
to economists. In particular, our approach allows us to evaluate the effects of
a tax on quoted and effective spreads, volume, volatility, gains from quoting,
gains from trade, and deadweight loss.
The model features a sequence of traders who strategically choose price
taking versus price making, an approach that mirrors market behavior ob-
served by Anand et al. (2005) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). Our model
is similar to Foucault (1999) but allows for a range of private reserve valu-
ations as well as varying proportions of pure market makers. These sources
of variation enable us to study the impact of a transaction tax on market
makers and investors. Since maker/taker market models pose many chal-
lenges, this is the first such model that addresses the effects of transaction
taxes.
We first analyze the model theoretically which lets us prove certain prop-
erties and bounds for the model behavior. We then extend the analysis to a
few specific cases. For these cases, we first consider a distribution of reser-
vation values which, while simple, allows us to find a closed-form solution
and derive comparative statics. We then repeat the analysis with the addi-
tion of market makers. Finally, we consider a more complicated distribution
of reservation values which must be analyzed numerically. We believe this
model more accurately mirrors current capital markets and thus is more
useful for quantifying potential effects of a transaction tax on markets.
The sequential market structure is most applicable to markets which are
thin, i.e. they have very small quantities of securities at the bid and ask, or
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markets where there are many substitutes (such as corporate bonds).5 Black
(1971) noted that markets in which traders compete on speed to get the best
price are effectively thin. Therefore, this model also has policy implications
for markets with high-frequency traders. A nice feature of our model is that
we can examine search costs with no assumption about the arrival rates of
a match; rather, matching happens endogenously by traders setting prices
to achieve their equilibrium maximum benefit.6
We expected ex-ante that a transaction tax of τ/share would increase
the spread by 2τ as price makers recover the tax through their quotes. We
also expected this widened spread to yield (i) lower fill rates/volume, (ii)
more limit orders (vs market orders), (iii) greater execution costs, and (iv)
longer times for buyers and sellers to find each other (aka search costs). We
were uncertain of what the effects would be on volatility and destabilizing
speculation.
We find that participants whose trades are taxed widen their quotes by
more than four times the nominal tax, a considerably larger effect than we
had anticipated. Those traders also derive less value from providing liquidity
(quoting) and are less likely to trade. Our extended model that is closest
to real capital markets suggests that for small values of the tax, a 1 basis
point (bp; 0.01%) tax increase decreases the volume traded by 0.5%–1%.
Furthermore, that model suggests that the maximal revenue raised is about
half of the na¨ıve assumption of tax × pre-tax volume. For a 50 bp tax,
the model suggests volume that falls by half; quoted spreads are about 3×
untaxed spreads; effective (trade-realized) spreads increase by about 3× the
nominal tax; the expected benefit of providing liquidity falls by more than
5Sequential trader models are applicable to markets with many substitutes because a
potential trader does not come repeatedly to the market but only buys the cheapest of
many substitutable assets.
6Search costs are a measure of liquidity defined by Lippman and McCall (1986) as “the
time until an asset is exchanged for money.”
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half; gains from trade fall by half; and, search costs almost double. If half
of the arriving traders are market makers, the realized volatility increases
monotonically versus the tax to more than triple for a 50 bp tax. However,
if none of the participants are market makers, the realized volatility may
decrease slightly as taxes increase until about 15 bp — and then increase
for taxes above 15 bp. For a tax of 50 bp, the realized volatility is about
1.2× the volatility without a tax. The revenue-optimal tax of 57–69 bp
increases spreads by about half; reduces volume by about half; and, reduces
the benefits of providing liquidity by about two-thirds.
Taxes also do not reduce the effects (externalities) of destabilizing spec-
ulators; rather, they accentuate those effects. As to the effects of interme-
diation in high-frequency or “thin” markets, we find that replacing half of
potential investors with market makers increases the optimal spread by up
to 25%. This effect occurs because investors and market makers compete for
liquidity. However, market makers reduce the volatility of trade prices. In
general, we find that market quality is increasingly sensitive to taxes with
market makers.
1. Literature Review
Historically, securities transactions taxes have been proposed, enacted,
modified, and even repealed in various countries.7 An overview of the issues
is given in Eichengreen et al. (1995).
Summers and Summers (1989), Stiglitz (1989), Kupiec (1995), Frankel
(1996), Felix and Sau (1996), Palley (1999), and Baker (2000) have all pro-
posed ‘Tobin-like’ taxes for various financial markets. ul Haq et al. (1996)
and Spahn (2002) suggest a 0.1% to 0.2% tax would balance the opposing
7Countries which have considered or enacted financial transaction taxes include Australia,
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United
Kingdom.
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objectives of lowering price volatility due to speculation and maintaining
market liquidity. Pollin et al. (2003) consider a securities transaction tax
for US financial markets as “one feature of a new financial architecture aimed
at contributing to financial stabilization.”
Studies opposed to transaction taxes include Friedman (1953), Grund-
fest and Shoven (1991), Campbell and Froot (1994), Kupiec (1995, 1996),
Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001), and Forbes (2001). Both ul Haq et al.
(1996) and Spahn (2002) point out that their proposed taxes would likely
have little impact on speculative activity. (We agree based on our results
for destabilizing speculators as in De Long et al. (1990).) Kupiec (1996)
indicates that a tax might lower price volatility but that it would also de-
crease asset prices such that return volatility increases with taxes. Schwert
and Seguin (1993) give a comprehensive overview of arguments both for and
against a securities transaction tax.
Empirical studies disagree as well. Umlauf’s (1993) study of Sweden im-
posing a 1% transaction tax in 1984 (and doubling it in 1986) found that
30% of equity trading volume moved to London, the market for interest
rate options dried up, market volatility did not decline, and volume did not
return to pre-tax levels when the tax was repealed in 1987.8 Liu and Zhu
(2009) found the October 1999 deregulation of full commissions in Japan
significantly increased price volatility in the equities market. Jones and
Seguin (1997), however, found that reducing commissions on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1975
was followed by reduced market volatility in the following year.
Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001) posit three reasons for this disagree-
ment. First, securities transaction taxes are often enacted with other policy
8For the years 1988–1990 between 48% and 52% of trading volume in Swedish equities
occurred in London. This may explain Swedish opposition to a transaction tax.
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shifts confounding causal inferences about changes in market measures. Sec-
ond, measuring the tax reduction of noise trading is difficult since there is
no way to determine if decreased market volume is due to informed traders
or noise traders. Third, if asset prices change because of the tax, there is no
way to determine if this was due to anticipation of the tax, trading moving
to other venues, or untaxed securities. We would add two more reasons.
First, comparing empirical studies is harder because securities transaction
taxes vary in size and scope — from 0.13 bp to 528 bp. Second, reducing
commissions is not the same as reducing a tax since lower commissions re-
duce rent-extraction and expose financial firms to more competition. Thus
initial conditions of profitability and competition might explain the differ-
ences between Liu and Zhu (2009) and Jones and Seguin (1997). All of these
issues make excellent arguments in favor of theoretical studies.
Very few microstructure-based studies have been done. Dupont and Lee
(2007) investigated a transaction tax using a Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
model incorporating spread and depth. They found that higher information
asymmetry made the tax more likely to decrease market liquidity. Mannaro
et al. (2008) used heterogeneous agent types to study transaction taxes in
simulated markets. For a single market, they found volatility increased as
the number of orders decreased; for two competing markets, traders tended
to avoid the taxed market — which exhibited higher volatility than the
untaxed market. Cipriani and Guarino (2008) found that a tax caused a
laboratory financial market (sequential trading, one market maker) to cease
trading during large disparities between an asset’s price and true value.
However, reduced noise trading caused by the tax offset some of the induced
market inefficiency. Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) showed that if adequate
liquidity were maintained a tax could help stabilize both double-auction and
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dealer markets.9 Otherwise, a tax reduced trading volume which increased
volatility as each trade had greater price impact. Demary (2010) used an
agent-based framework to show that tax rates above 0.1% destabilized the
market and that taxes had stronger effects on more risk-averse traders.
Our model also allows inference about search costs. Typically, search
models assume sequential search and bargaining and explicitly detail the
search process (for example, assuming Poisson arrival rates to the market).
Buyers and sellers seek to trade one unit of an asset with pairings assigned
by a matching process. Paired traders bargain in an attempt to agree on
a price of the asset and re-enter the market until an agreement is reached.
Examples of such models include Diamond (1982), Rubenstein and Wolin-
sky (1985), Gale (1987a,b), Binmore and Herrero (1988), Lu and McAfee
(1996), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Duffie et al. (2005), and Duffie et al.
(2010). Our model is more similar to how Lo and MacKinlay (1990) looked
at nonsynchronous trading.
2. Model of a Price Maker/Taker Market
Our limit order book model is similar to the simple price maker/taker
model of Foucault (1999).10 The economy has one risky asset with funda-
mental value v. Traders arrive sequentially, one per unit of time, and have
a spectrum of idiosyncratic reserve values v + dt where dt
iid∼ F . We assume
that F is a symmetric distribution with a mean of zero and finite variance:
a trader with dt < 0 would prefer to sell, a trader with dt > 0 would prefer
to buy.
9Maintenance of adequate liquidity for such findings to be relevant is more likely in a
dealer market where a market maker is expected to maintain a two-sided market.
10Traders in the Foucault (1999) framework have only two possible reservation values,
v ± L which occur with equal probability. We allow a range of private valuations and
quotes based on these private valuations because for only two possible valuations, as in
Foucault (1999), a tax would either have no effect or eliminate all trading.
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We assume that traders have heterogeneous reasons for trading: alpha
(real or perceived), business risks to hedge, and inventory risk to eliminate
being a few examples of such reasons. We also assume traders have access to
inventory or borrowed stock which allows them to sell without constraints.11
For simplicity and tractability, quotes live for only one period; and, to pre-
vent gaming, the market continues at each period with non-unit probability
ρ. Traders realize the utility of their trade (whether through expected return
or by benefiting from a risk-reducing hedge) immediately following trading.
2.1. Strategic Quoting: Make versus Take. Each trader seeks to trade
one unit of the risky asset. Trading may be done by taking the prevailing
bid-ask quote (i.e. sending a market order) or by making a new bid-ask quote
(sending limit orders which replace the prevailing quote).12 Thus each trader
plays a game against the next trader. To clarify the exposition, we will call
these two traders Ilsa (the time t trader) and Rick (the time t+ 1 trader).13
Traders pay tax at both position entry and exit: if Ilsa trades with Rick,
each is debited a transaction tax of τ on both entry and exit of their po-
sitions. Consequently, one could conjecture that if Ilsa quotes a bid and
ask, she will shade her quotes, i.e. pass on some amount of the tax to Rick
by quoting a bid of v − δt and an ask of v + βt, where δt and βt are func-
tions of the tax τ . Ilsa solves for these equilibrium offsets to decide the
optimal amount of the tax to (potentially) pass on to Rick. This strate-
gic price shading causes δt and βt to be functions of Ilsa’s reservation value
11Institutional traders generally have access to borrowable stock via brokerage customer’s
holdings as well as market making inventory.
12This yields phenomena seen in markets such as failure to trade when no one of the
opposite preference arrives in the market. Since trading is not guaranteed, the model
helps explain how equilibrium fill rates/volumes are affected by changes in market setup.
13While we use this language to discuss the game played by each trader, this should not
be construed as implying a repeated game. The setup is a sequential trader model: as
time goes by, a sequence of unique traders arrive. Thus if a trader Sam first plays the
game at any time s, we know that Sam will never play it again.
10 D. W. R. ROSENTHAL, N. D. M. THOMAS, AND H. WANG
v+dt, the distribution of Rick’s unknown reservation value v+dt+1, and the
transaction tax τ . A diagram of Ilsa’s possible gains is shown in Figure 1.
•
Ilsa quotes
bid, ask
Ilsa sends
market order
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
N • ρ
1−ρ
market
closes
MMM
MMM
MMM
MMM
M •
Rick quotes
bid, ask
Rick sends
market order
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
P 0
RT |dt 0 RQ|dt
time t (Ilsa) time t+ 1 (Rick)
Figure 1. Ilsa’s gains in different scenarios. Her gain for
price taking is RT |dt; her expected gain for quoting prices is
RQ|dt. With probability ρ ≤ 1, the market continues.
Because the game played every time period is between the current and
next-period trader, the solution takes a form which does not depend on past
states. Therefore, we can assume that prices are static (i.e. ∆v = 0) without
loss of generality and solve for equilibrium δ and β (without time subscripts).
Were ∆v 6= 0, we could merely shift the dt distribution (as well as δ and β)
by E(∆v). Were Var(∆v) > 0, we could scale the dt distribution to have a
variance of Var(∆v) + Var(dt). Therefore, while we work with static prices,
the results here are applicable to stochastically-evolving prices.
We determine optimal trade strategies by working forward from time t.
The time t trader, Ilsa has imperfect knowledge: She sees her reservation
value v+dt but not Rick’s (v+dt+1); however, the distribution of reservation
values is common knowledge. Taking the quoted bid or ask price has a known
benefit of price taking RT |dt,
(1) RT |dt = max(dt − βt−1 − 2τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
buy at prior ask
,−dt − δt−1 − 2τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
sell at prior bid
).
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If Ilsa decides to quote, she chooses not to take the current bid or ask
price for benefit RT |dt; she prefers to quote optimal bid and ask prices for
the time t+ 1 trader, Rick, for an expected benefit of RQ|dt. This optimal
expected value defines the boundary between sending a market order and
quoting and varies with the reservation value v + dt. Her utility is then the
greater of the known and expected benefit:
(2) Ut = max(RT |dt, RQ|dt).
Since the iid distribution of all trader’s reservation values is common
knowledge, Ilsa solves for Rick’s optimal fixed-point quote revenue R0∗Q given
the unconditional distribution of dt+1 and maximizes RQ in equation (30).
When the next trader, Rick, enters the market at time t + 1, he decides
whether to trade against Ilsa’s quote or quote a bid and ask for the following
trader. Ilsa does not know Rick’s reservation value v + dt+1. She can find
the unconditional expectation of his optimal quote revenue, R0∗Q ; however,
defining this and proceeding further requires that we now intoduce some
formalism.
2.2. Formal Definition of the Maker/Taker Game. To clarify our
thinking and the exposition, we may define the game formally. We define
the reservation price offsets, the iid dt’s, on a probability space (Ω,F , F ).
For convenience, we assume that the state space is Ω = R or some finite
subset of R. The sigma field F may be the Borel sigma field or any pi − λ
system defined on Ω. F and f are the unconditional cumulative distribution
function (cdf) and probability density function (pdf) for F .
Player 1 (Ilsa) observes a signal T1 = dt ∈ F ; she does not observe the
signal T2 = dt+1 ∈ F received by player 2 (Rick). The common prior on
(Ω, T1 × T2) is the bivariate distribution F × F .
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The action space Ai for each player is that for setting bid and ask prices
(δ, β) ∈ Ai∈{1,2} = R2 ∪ {∅,∅}; an action of {∅,∅} implies taking the
existing price and not making a price for the following trader. Each player’s
utility is defined as Ui∈{1,2} : A1 × A2 × F → R. Since quoted prices and
taxes are bounded, we know that U is bounded.
Ilsa’s chooses the greater of RT |dt and her maximal RQ|dt. (Her actions
only affect RQ|dt.) Ilsa finds Rick’s expected benefit of quoting R0∗Q as:
(3) R0∗Q = E(RQ|dt) =
∫
Ω
max
δ,β
RQ(δ, β|dt)dF.
2.3. Characterizing Propositions. With the game well-defined, there are
a number of properties of the game we can investigate. We characterize the
game by proving a number of propositions. (Proofs are in Appendix A.)
We return to Ilsa’s decision: She must take the existing quote or make a
new quote for Rick. Rick is in the same position as Ilsa: he does not know
the type of the following trader (Sam) and so makes his decision according
to the logic in Table 1. We can also show that one and only one of the
clauses in Table 1 will always be satisfied
Condition Action
v − δ − (v + dt+1)− 2τ > R0∗Q
=⇒ dt+1 < −R0∗Q − δ − 2τ Sell at Ilsa’s bid
v + dt+1 − (v + β)− 2τ > R0∗Q
=⇒ dt+1 > R0∗Q + β + 2τ Buy at Ilsa’s ask
Otherwise Quote new bid and ask for Sam
Table 1. Rick’s decision rules for taking Ilsa’s quoted prices.
If none of the conditions are satisfied, Rick will quote his own
bid and ask instead.
Proposition 1. If taxes, bid-ask spreads, and the optimal quote revenue R0∗Q
are non-negative, then Rick (and all traders) have a clear course of action:
only one of the conditions in Table 1 is satisfied.
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Ilsa’s conditionally expected quote revenue, RQ|dt, is then:
RQ|dt = ρP (Rick sells at bid)(
utility or
sale price︷ ︸︸ ︷
v + dt −
bought
from Rick︷ ︸︸ ︷
(v − δ) −2τ)
+ ρP (Rick buys at ask)(v + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
sold to
Rick
− (v + dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility or
buy price
−2τ).
(4)
= ρF (−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ)(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρ
(
1− F (R0∗Q + β + 2τ)
)
(β − dt − 2τ).
(5)
Ilsa maximizes her quote revenue by setting the partial derivatives,
∂RQ|dt
∂δ
and
∂RQ|dt
∂β , to 0 and solving. This implies that her optimal strategy is to bid
at v − δ and ask for v + β, where the bid and ask offsets are respectively,14
δ =
F (G(δ))
f(G(δ))
− dt + 2τ, and β = F (G(β))
f(G(β))
+ dt + 2τ, where(6)
G(x) = −R0∗Q − x− 2τ (expected gain boundary)(7)
defines the boundary separating where Ilsa expects Rick would gain by
trading with her. Specifically, if Rick’s dt+1 < G(δ), Ilsa expects that Rick
would gain by selling to her at her bid; and, if Rick’s dt+1 > −G(β), Ilsa
expects Rick would gain by buying from her at her asking price.
From this, we can see that the bid and ask are skewed in line with Ilsa’s
reservation value: For a positive dt, she will quote a bid and ask higher than
for dt = 0; and, for a negative dt she will quote a bid and ask lower than for
dt = 0.
Proposition 2 (Spread Skewed with dt). If dt > 0, then the optimal bid and
ask parameters are such that β > δ. Similarly, if dt < 0, then the optimal
14Note that we have used the symmetry of F to express the probability of Rick trading
at Ilsa’s asking price in equation (5) via F instead of 1− F .
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bid and ask parameters are such that β < δ. If dt = 0, the optimal bid and
ask parameters are such that β = δ.
We can also put a lower bound on the bid-ask spread. The lower bound
shows that in all situations, the spread is more than four times the nominal
tax rate.
Proposition 3 (Spread Exceeds 4× Nominal Tax). For any distribution F
of reservation values, the bid-ask spread δ+β is greater than 4τ : i.e. δ+β >
4τ . Put differently: the spread is more than four times the quoted tax rate,
twice the taxes collected from any trader or at any time, and more than the
total round-trip taxes for all involved traders.
Proposition 4 (Spread Upper Bound). For any distribution of reservation
values symmetric about 0 with finite variance L2, the bid-ask spread δ + β
may be bounded above by δ + β ≤ L2
2G(δ)2f(G(δ))
+ L
2
2G(β)2f(G(β))
+ 4τ .
With the lower bound, we can also show that the benefit of quoting a bid
and ask for all players is always positive.
Proposition 5 (Positive Quoting Benefit). For any player (with type dt),
the benefit of quoting is always positive: i.e. RQ|dt > 0
Finally, with some very general assumptions, we may show the existence
of a Markov Perfect equilibrium for the game between the current and next-
period trader.
Proposition 6 (Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibrium). Assume the
preceding setup with bounded quotes and taxes. If the pdf of dt’s, f , is such
that dt has finite variance, the game played between Ilsa and Rick (or any
two subsequent traders) has a Markov Perfect equilibrium.
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Showing that the Markov Perfect equilibrium is unique requires slightly
more restrictive assumptions.
Proposition 7 (Uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equilibrium: Continuous
CDF). Assume the preceding setup with bounded quotes and taxes and that
the cdf of dt’s is continuous. Then the Markov Perfect equilibrium of the
game played between Ilsa and Rick (or any two subsequent traders) is unique.
3. Closed-Form Analysis
To confirm that the model behaves nicely, we examine model behavior
for two simple distributions of reservation values. This enables us to find a
closed-form solution and derive comparative statics.
The simplest distribution is that of the uniform on [−L,L]; using this
allows us to gain intuition into the model’s behavior. However, we are also
interested in considering the effect of a tax on market makers. Therefore, the
second distribution we consider is a mixture of the uniform with a point mass
at dt = 0 to represent the indifference of market makers between buying and
selling. Examining this simple case lets us see how market maker behavior
and participation is affected.
3.1. Uniform Investors. We first consider a market with only investors,
i.e. being indifferent between buying and selling is a measure-zero event.
The reservation value offsets are uniformly-distributed: dt
iid∼ Unif(−L,L)
or, equivalently,
f(x) =

1
2L x ∈ [−L,L]
0 else
F (x) =

0 x < −L
x+L
2L x ∈ [−L,L)
1 x ≥ L
(8)
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From equations (6) and (8), we can solve for the bid and ask offsets
explicitly:
δ =
1
2
(L−R0∗Q − dt), β =
1
2
(L−R0∗Q + dt).(9)
Differentiating with respect to tax τ or continuation probability ρ, we get
∂δ
∂τ
=
∂β
∂τ
= −1
2
∂R0∗Q
∂τ
,
∂δ
∂ρ
=
∂β
∂ρ
= −1
2
∂R0∗Q
∂ρ
.(10)
Working with the constraints for an interior solution, we explicitly solve
for the expected quoting benefit, R0∗Q . (Details are in Appendix B.)
(11) R0∗Q =
ρ
24L2
(2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)3.
Differentiating with respect to tax τ or continuation probability ρ, we get
∂R0∗Q
∂τ
= − ρ(2L−R
0∗
Q − 4τ)2
2L2 + ρ4(2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2
< 0,(12)
∂R0∗Q
∂ρ
=
(2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)3
24L2 + 3ρ(2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2
> 0.(13)
This implies that
∂δ
∂τ
> 0,
∂β
∂τ
> 0,
∂δ
∂ρ
< 0,
∂β
∂ρ
< 0.(14)
The comparative statics therefore suggest that in equilibrium:
(1) increasing taxes reduces the value of quoting (providing liquidity);
(2) increasing the likelihood the market stays open increases the value
of quoting;
(3) increasing taxes increases bid-ask spreads; and,
(4) increasing the likelihood the market stays open decreases spreads.
3.2. Uniform Investors with Market Makers. We next consider the
addition of market makers to the market by mixing the prior distribution of
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total mass 1− µ (representing investors) with a point mass of 0 < µ < 1 at
dt = 0 (representing the preferences of market makers).
15 This means that
being indifferent between buying and selling is no longer a measure-zero
event and that the dt CDF is no longer continuous. Therefore, we should
expect the results to differ (and the work to be more involved). Supporting
lemmas and proofs are in Appendix C.
If we keep the definition of f and F from equation (8), we have that:
(15) dt
iid∼

0 w.p. µ
Unif(−L,L) w.p. 1− µ.
We then define the quote revenue RQ|dt as
RQ|dt = ρV1(δ) + ρV2(β) where(16)
V1(δ) = [(1− µ)F (G(δ)) + µI(G(δ))](δ + dt − 2τ) and(17)
V2(β) = [(1− µ)F (G(β)) + µI(G(β))](β − dt − 2τ)(18)
where V1(δ) is the expected benefit of quoting a bid v − δ and V2(β) is the
expected benefit of quoting an offer v + β.
Using these definitions, we can show that maxδ V1(δ) ≥ 0 and maxβ V2(β) ≥
0 with strict positivity holding iff dt ∈ (R0∗Q + 4τ − L,L] and dt ∈ [−L,L−
R0∗Q − 4τ), respectively.
Now we note that
lim
δ→∞
V1(δ) = 0, lim
δ→−∞
V1(δ) = −∞,(19)
lim
β→∞
V2(β) = 0, lim
β→−∞
V2(β) = −∞,(20)
and that V1(δ) and V2(β) are discontinuous at:
15Assigning dt = 0 makes market makers indifferent between buying and selling; the effect
of inventory risk is ignored. However, market makers with inventory risk can be thought
of as belonging to the population of traders with non-zero dt’s.
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δ0 = −R0∗Q − 2τ, and β0 = −R0∗Q − 2τ.(21)
Assume that 2τ < L and R0∗Q < 2L− 4τ . We then have
∂V1(δ)
∂δ
=

(1− µ) + µ = 1 G(δ) > L
1+µ
2 −
(1−µ)(R0∗Q +2δ+dt)
2L 0 ≤ G(δ) ≤ L
1−µ
2 −
(1−µ)(R0∗Q +2δ+dt)
2L −L ≤ G(δ) ≤ 0
0 G(δ) < −L,
(22)
∂V2(β)
∂β
=

(1− µ) + µ = 1 G(β) > L
1+µ
2 −
(1−µ)(R0∗Q +2β+dt)
2L 0 ≤ G(β) ≤ L
1−µ
2 −
(1−µ)(R0∗Q +2β+dt)
2L −L ≤ G(β) ≤ 0
0 G(β) < −L.
(23)
We may then easily verify that the second derivatives are non-positive for
all δ and β, R0∗Q > 0, and τ ≥ 0. This implies we may find local maximizers
δM and βM of V1(δ) and V2(β).
We then have V1(δM ) defined on R
0∗
Q + 4τ − L < dt ≤ L:
V1(δM ) = (1− µ)F (G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ)(24)
=
1− µ
8L
(L−R0∗Q + dt − 4τ)2 > 0,(25)
and V2(βM ) defined on −L ≤ dt < L−R0∗Q − 4τ :
V2(βM ) = (1− µ)F (G(βM ))(βM − dt − 2τ)(26)
=
1− µ
8L
(L−R0∗Q − dt − 4τ)2 > 0.(27)
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It follows that maxδ V1(δ) = max{V1(δ0), V1(δM )} and maxβ V2(β) =
max{V2(β0), V2(βM )}. Moreover, if µ → 1, V1(δ0) > V1(δM ) and V2(β0) >
V2(βM ). The various cases for the functional behavior of V1(δ) are shown
in Figure 2 to illustrate the above. The behavior for V2(β) is similar (albeit
for −dt).
      
   
   
δM
δ0
G(δ)>0 G(δ)<0
L-2τ-RQ0*
δ
      
   
   
δM
δ0
G(δ)>0 G(δ)<0
L-2τ-RQ0*
δ
      
   
   
δM
δ0
G(δ)>0 G(δ)<0
L-2τ-RQ0* δ
2τ-dt
{dt < 4τ +R0∗Q }∪ dt = 4τ +R0∗Q dt > 4τ +R0∗Q
{R0∗Q + 4τ − L < dt}
Figure 2. Three possible cases for V1(δ), the expected ben-
efit of quoting a bid of v − δ vs δ: V1(δ) jumps up at δ0,
V1(δ) is continuous, or V1(δ) jumps down at δ0. The cases
are partitioned depending on the reservation price v + dt of
the liquidity provider. The dot at δ0 denotes that V1(δ) is
left-continuous.
We also note that if the tax is excessively high, the value of quoting at
the gain boundary (G(δ0) = 0) will be negative. In other words, a quote
Ilsa expects Rick to be indifferent to taking does not have expected benefit
to her. Specifically, if 4τ ≥ L then V1(δ0) ≤ 0 and V2(β0) ≤ 0. If we instead
assume 4τ < L and R0∗Q < L− 4τ , we get that Ilsa expects positive benefit
to quoting a bid and ask at the gain boundary for Rick. This is also the bid
and ask most attractive to market makers; however, “most attractive” does
not mean more attractive than quoting.
For Ilsa to expect a market-making Rick to trade against Ilsa’s quote, we
require more restrictive conditions: the expected value of quoting and the
tax must be sufficiently small; and, Ilsa’s private reservation price must be
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sufficiently extreme. In particular, Lemma 7 in Appendix C shows that a
market-making Rick will trade against Ilsa’s quote if
(1) 0 ≤ τ < µL√
2µ+2µ2+2µ
, (tax sufficiently small)
(2) R0∗Q ≤ 4µL√2µ+2µ2+2µ − 4τ , and (quote benefit sufficiently small)
(3) |dt| > x1 +R0∗Q + 4τ (Ilsa’s view sufficiently extreme)
where x1 =
1+3µ
1−µ L−
2
√
2µ+2µ2
1−µ L.
We can also show that the comparative statics for this market are the
same as for the uniform case without market makers.
Proposition 8. Assume 2τ < L. There exists a unique R0∗Q ∈ (0, 2L− 4τ)
such that E(RQ|dt) = R0∗Q ,
∂R0∗Q
∂τ < 0, and
∂R0∗Q
∂ρ > 0.
In other words: taxes reduce the expected benefit of providing liquidity
and a market more likely to continue trading increases the expected benefit
of providing liquidity.
The comparative statics for the proportion of market makers are a bit
more involved. We first restate the conditions for finding the sign of
∂R0∗Q
∂µ :
Proposition 9. Suppose R0∗Q is the solution to E(RQ|dt) = R0∗Q . Then the
sign of
∂R0∗Q
∂µ is the same as
(28) Z(µ) = 3
(
1− R
0∗
Q + 4τ
L
)2
+ 1− α2(µ)
( √
2µ+ 2µ2
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)
+ 1
)
where α(µ) = 4µ√
2µ+2µ2+2µ
. Furthermore, this sign depends on µ and ρ.
This suggest that the comparative statics need some qualification.
Corollary 1. If (1− 1√
6
)L < R0∗Q + 4τ < α(µ)L, then
∂R0∗Q
∂µ < 0.
Corollary 2. If 0 < R0∗Q + 4τ < (1 − 1√6)L, then ∃µ¯ > µ0 such that when
µ ≥ µ¯, ∂R
0∗
Q
∂µ > 0.
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In other words: For high values of providing liquidity, increasing the pro-
portion of market makers decreases the value of providing liquidity. How-
ever, for low values of providing liquidity, increasing the proportion of mar-
ket makers increases the value of providing liquidity. These results suggest
a future extension of this model: exploring the equilibrium proportion of
market makers.
4. Numerical Analysis
To study how a transaction tax affects market quality for a setup closer to
real capital markets, we analyze traders in a market with private reservation
values distributed according to a mixture of: (i) a point mass of 0 < µ < 1
at dt = 0 (representing market makers), and (ii) a normal distribution with
mean zero, variance L2, and total mass 1− µ (representing investors):
(29) dt
iid∼ f =

0 w.p. µ
N(0, L2) w.p. 1− µ.
We examine the model for tax τ ranging from 0 to 50 bp. We also study
the effect of taxes for different proportions µ of arriving traders being market
makers. The mean reservation value, v = $20, is calibrated to be close to
the average stock price in the US equity market. The reservation value
standard deviation of L = $0.50 (2.5% of v) is calibrated to be the same
as the daily volatility of a stock with a 40% annualized volatility; and, the
market continuation probability is set to be ρ = 0.9.16 We look at both the
average effect across the market and the effect for market makers.
16Results are robust to changes in ρ since ρ falls out of the optimal bid and ask formula.
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4.1. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium. We can rewrite Ilsa’s
conditional expected quote revenue, RQ|dt, as:
RQ|dt = ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ
L
)
(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρ(1− µ)Φ
(
−R0∗Q − β − 2τ
L
)
(β − dt − 2τ)
+ ρµI(−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ ≥ 0)(δ + dt − 2τ)
+ ρµI(−R0∗Q − β − 2τ ≥ 0)(β − dt − 2τ)
(30)
where Φ is the standard normal cdf. We then show that this distribution
also admits a unique Markov Perfect equilibrium. (All supporting proofs
are in Appendix D.)
Proposition 10 (Uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equilibrium: Normal with
Market Makers). Under the preceding setup and for bounded quotes and
taxes, the game played between Ilsa and Rick (or any two subsequent traders)
has a unique Markov Perfect equilibrium.
Finally, these more specific assumptions about dt allow us to find a
stronger upper bound for the bid-ask spread:
Proposition 11 (Spread Upper Bound: Normal with Market Makers). If
the distribution F of reservation values is N(0, L2), the bid-ask spread δ+β
is bounded above by: δ + β ≤ L
R0∗Q +4τ
+ 4τ .
4.2. Solving for Equilibrium. Since the iid distribution of all trader’s
reservation values is common knowledge, Ilsa solves for Rick’s optimal fixed-
point quote revenue R0∗Q given the unconditional distribution of dt+1 and
maximizes RQ in equation (30).
In practical terms, solving for R0∗Q requires iterating over a sufficiently
large range of values for dt+1; computing each optimal RQ|dt+1; and then
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determining the expected R0∗Q . We must make sure not to double-count the
center of the distribution; and, we must handle the tails appropriately. We
then repeat this until R0∗Q converges.
The one complication of our distribution of potential traders is the point
mass of market makers at dt = 0. Because of this, RQ contains two indicator
functions to handle the possibility that Rick is a market maker: one for
the possibility that Ilsa’s bid appeals to a market maker and one for the
possibility that her ask appeals to a market maker.17 We then find the
contrained maxima over three regions: where neither indicator function is
active, where the first indicator function is active, and where the second
indicator function is active. (We know both indicator functions are never
simultaneously active by Proposition 1.)
4.3. Metrics of Market Quality. Figure 3 shows that the dynamics for
a market with static v and no taxes appear similar to that seen in real data.
We can also note that having more market makers tends to stabilize the
range in which a security trades.
While these plots may be reassuring that nothing is drastically wrong,
visual examination is not a proper assessment of changes in market quality.
We therefore examine the following metrics to assess the effects of the tax:
Optimal Spread: Optimal spread which may be quoted (or not).
Quoted Spread: Average spread that is quoted.
Effective Spread: Average difference between buy, sell prices.
Fill Rate: Fraction of orders which trade; analogous to volume.
Search Cost: Expected time until an order is filled.
Expected Quote Revenue: R0∗Q ; expected reward for quoting.
Realized Volatility: Volatility of trade price changes.
17Market makers have the same reservation value and so would not trade with one another.
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Figure 3. Simulated trades (stars) and quotes (lines) for a
market with no transaction tax. The left plot is for a market
with no market makers; the right plot is for a market with
50% of potential traders being market makers. The market
with market makers trades in a tighter range: All trades
occur between $19.75 and $20.25; trades occur outside this
range for the market without market makers (left).
Gains from Trade: Equilibrium expected gains of make/take choice.
Deadweight Loss: Gains from trade + tax revenue vs without tax.
Revenue-optimal Tax Rate: Tax rate which maximizes tax revenue.
Not all of the comparative statics we care about are easily found by solv-
ing the game played by Ilsa and Rick. We find the quoted spread, effective
spread, realized volatility, gains from trade, and deadweight loss via simu-
lation.18 For each level of tax explored, we generate a random sequence of
100,000 traders with iid N(v, L) reservation value offsets. For each trader,
we record their trading decision (make or take prices). If a trade occurs, we
record the direction (buy/sell), the price, and the expected gain from trade.
4.4. Optimal and Quoted Spread. The left plot in Figure 4 shows that
the optimal spread one would consider quoting increases with the tax: by
18While we could try to derive the volatility from the quoted spread using Roll (1984),
that would ignore the endogeneity of when trade occurs and thus would be inaccurate.
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270% without market makers, from 65 bp with no tax to 240 bp with a
50 bp ($0.10) tax; and, by 170% with half of potential traders being market
makers, from 90 bp with no tax to 240 bp with a 50 bp tax. At τ = 50 bp,
the change in the optimal spread is 3.5× and 3× the change in the tax,
for markets without market makers and with 50% market makers. In other
words: traders pay 200%–250% more than the tax.
The right plot in Figure 4 shows the suoted spread — i.e. the optimal
spread filtered by when traders choose to quote it instead of taking the prior
quote. Regardless of the prevalence of market makers, adding a 50 bp tax
approximately triples the quoted spread. The quoted spread without a tax is
slightly higher for increasing proportions of market makers. This is because
an increasing prevalence of market makers makes quoting less appealing for
investors and often gives them better prices to take.
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Figure 4. Optimal bid-ask spread (bp, left) and quoted bid-
ask spread (bp, right) vs transaction tax rates (bp). Curves
show 10% increments of market makers, from none to half of
arriving traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0
(market makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). The
marginal spread is always greater than the marginal tax, and
investors always pay more than four times the nominal tax.
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4.5. Effective Spread. Figure 5 shows that regardless of the prevalence
of market makers, adding a 50 bp tax approximately triples the effective
spread. (The effective spread without a tax is slightly lower for increasing
proportions of market makers.) This differs from the results for the opti-
mal spread in that the optimal spread increased with higher proportions of
market makers. This difference is because an increasing prevalence of mar-
ket makers makes quoting less appealing for investors and often gives them
better prices to take.
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Figure 5. Effective spreads (spreads at trade times) vs
transaction tax rate (bp). Curves show 10% increments of
market makers, from none to half of arriving traders. Traders
have a reservation value offset of 0 (market makers) or with
volatility of 2.5% (investors). More market makers reduce
effective spreads slightly and higher taxes increase effective
spreads.
4.6. Fill Rate and Search Cost. Figure 6 shows two plots: the left plot
shows the fill rate and the right plot shows the fill rate adjusted for the
fact that market makers do not trade with one another. In both plots we
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see a 50% drop in the fill rate (volume) at a tax of 50 bp regardless of the
prevalence of market makers. The lower fill rates for increasing proportions
of market makers is largely due to the fact that market makers do not trade
with one another in this model. For example, were we to ignore the times
when one market maker follows another, the untaxed fill rate for half the
arriving traders being market makers would be 72% — much closer to the
75% fill rate without market makers.19
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Figure 6. Fill rate (left) and adjusted fill rate (right) vs
transaction tax rates (bp). The adjusted fill rate corrects for
the fact that market makers do not trade with one another.
Curves are shown for 10% increments of market makers, from
none to half of arriving traders being market makers. Traders
have a reservation value offset of 0 (market makers) or with
volatility of 2.5% (investors). The fill rate drops by about
half for a tax of 50 bp.
Harris (2002) says, “Trading is a search problem. [. . . ] Sellers seek buyers
willing to pay high prices. Buyers seek sellers willing to sell at low prices.”
While search models often take the form of sequential search and bargain
models, our model can yield insight into search costs if we focus only on
how long it takes in toto until a trade occurs. Since Lippman and McCall
19The 72% figure is found by dividing the untaxed fill rate of 54% by the probability of
not having two market makers in a row (0.75).
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(1986) view liquidity as “the time until an asset is exchanged for money”,
we study how a transaction tax affects the average time between trades. If
the probability of a fill is Pf (i.e. the fill rate), we can infer relative search
costs (waiting times), tw, by inverting the fill rate: tw ∝ Pf−1. Search costs
are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Search costs (expected waiting times to trade) vs
transaction tax rate (bp). Curves show 10% increments of
market makers, from none to half of arriving traders. Traders
have a reservation value offset of 0 (market makers) or with
volatility of 2.5% (investors).
As taxes increase, the waiting time between trades increases. The effect
of a transaction tax on search costs is the inverse of the results for fill rates:
a 50 bp tax roughly doubles search costs.
4.7. Expected Quote Revenue. The average traders’ expected quote rev-
enue/share without market makers decreases from $0.064 (no tax) to $0.032
(50 bp tax) — a 50% decrease. Without a tax, the expected quote revenue
increases with the proportion of market makers up to about 40% of arriv-
ing traders being market makers. For 50% of arriving traders being market
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makers, the expected quote revenue falls slightly. In all of these cases, how-
ever, the expected quote revenue drops faster as we increase the proportion
of market makers. Thus when half the arriving traders are market makers,
the effects of a tax are much greater: the expected quote revenue/share de-
creases from $0.074 to $0.027 — a 64% decrease. Thus the expected benefit
of providing liquidity falls by about half to two-thirds for a 50 bp tax. To
the extent that market makers have costs of doing business comparable to
expected quote revenues, we could expect market makers to exit the market
more than this model suggests.20
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Figure 8. Expected quote revenues vs transaction tax (bp).
Curves show 10% increments of market makers, from none to
half of potential traders. Traders have a reservation value off-
set of 0 (market makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors).
Without market makers, the expected quote revenues drop
by about half for a 50 bp tax; with half the arriving traders
being market makers, the expected quote revenues drop by
about two-thirds for a 50 bp tax. This model does not include
costs which might imply even greater reductions in expected
revenues.
20While this model does not allow market makers to exit the market, they can publish
quotes which greatly reduce their probability of trading.
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4.8. Realized Volatility. The plot of realized volatility in Figure 9 shows
that the effects of a transaction tax are not always obvious.
For markets where 30% or more of the arriving traders are market mak-
ers, a transaction tax increases the realized volatility monotonically. Fur-
thermore, markets with more market makers have lower realized volatility
for taxes up to 50 bp and are more sensitive to a transactions tax. For ex-
ample, a market where half of the arriving traders are market makers has an
untaxed realized volatility of about $0.11 and a realized volatility of about
$0.22 for a tax of 50 bp — a doubling of volatility.
However, for markets where 20% or less of the arriving traders are market
makers, a transaction tax initially lowers volatility. The decrease is small,
but the most extreme decrease is for market without market makers. With-
out market makers, the volatility decreases from $0.193 without a tax to
$0.186 for a 12 bp tax (a 4% decrease). The initial decrease in volatility
is because an increase in taxes lowers fill rates which makes taking a worse
price (i.e. a price closer to v) more likely. However, this is a second-order
effect which is dominated by the increase in spreads as taxes increase.
4.9. Gains from Trade. Since market makers are intermediaries, they are
unlikely to take a directional bet. Therefore we might expect that they
will trade closer to the mean reservation value and thus for lower expected
revenue than most other traders. This is indeed the case: increasing the
fraction of market makers lowers the average gains from trade. (One could
also view this as market makers reducing the dispersion in beliefs about
prices.)
While market makers intermediate for lower returns, they also (in our
model) lower volume because they compete for liquidity. Therefore we might
expect market makers to lower total gains from trade. Figure 10 shows that
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Figure 9. Volatility (of trade prices) vs transaction tax rate
(bp). Curves show 10% increments of market makers, from
none to half of potential traders. Market makers have a
reservation value offset of 0 while investors have an offset
with volatility of 2.5%. More market makers leads to lower
volatility yet makes market volatility more sensitive to taxes:
a 50 bp tax doubles volatility. Taxes up to about 15 bp
decrease volatility for markets without market makers but
increase volatility by about one-fifth for a 50 bp tax.
to be true; total gains from trade are higher without market makers. For
all markets, regardless of the proportion of arriving traders who are market
makers, the total gains from trade drop about 60% for a 50 bp tax. Were
we to correct the gains for trade by only examining investors, we would see
that the gains for trade for investors are higher with market makers.
4.10. Deadweight Loss. Since we are considering gains from trade and
tax revenue, it makes sense to think about the costs and benefits of the tax.
We therefore look at the deadweight loss: the reduction in gains from trade
less tax revenues.21 If there were an externality that we could price, we
21Thanks to Martin Sˇuster for this idea.
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Figure 10. Total gains from trade vs transaction tax rate
(bp) for 100,000 simulated traders. Curves show 10% incre-
ments of market makers, from none to half of arriving traders.
Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market makers)
or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). A 50 bp tax decreases
the total gains from trade by about 60%. Market makers
lower total gains from trade since they trade for small mar-
gins.
could also consider that.22 Figure 11 shows the deadweight loss per order.
We look at the loss per order because considering the loss per trade would
ignore the damaging effects of reduced volume. The plot shows that for
no positive tax level is the deadweight loss negative — implying that the
socially optimal tax is none.
4.11. Revenue-Optimal Tax Rates. Since one argument for transaction
taxes is their revenue-generating capabilities, we consider the maximal gov-
ernment revenue possible in our model. The Laffer curves in Figure 12
show that the maximum government revenue of 14–24 bp per order would
22Volatility could be one such externality; however, the prior analysis of volatility suggests
that the tax does little to mitigate volatility.
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Figure 11. Deadweight loss per order vs transaction tax
rate (bp) for 100,000 simulated traders. Curves show 10%
increments of market makers, from none to half of arriving
traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0 (market
makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). At no tax level
is the deadweight loss negative, suggesting that the socially
optimal tax is 0 bp.
be generated at tax rates of 57–69 bp per trade with lower taxes being
revenue-optimal for greater proportions of market makers.
At the revenue-optimal tax rates, however, other measures reveal a great
decrease in market quality. Table 2 shows the various measures of market
quality for the different revenue-optimal tax rates. In general, the revenue-
optimal tax rates would increase effective spreads (direct trading costs) by
200%–300%, decrease fill rates (volume) by more than half, reduce the re-
ward for providing liquidity by two-thirds, and increase volatility by between
one-third and more than double. All of these results suggest conditions that
would likely induce trading to move elsewhere as documented in empiri-
cal studies. Finally, the revenue raised falls by over 40% between markets
with no intermediation and those with half of arriving traders being market
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Figure 12. Laffer curve: Transaction tax rates vs equilib-
rium tax revenues (bp) with revenue-optimal rates indicated
by a circle. Curves show 10% increments of market makers,
from none to half of potential traders. Traders have a reser-
vation value offset of 0 (market makers) or with volatility of
2.5% (investors). The revenue-optimal tax ranges from 57 bp
to 69 bp. Tax revenue falls by about 40% for half of arriving
traders being market makers; more developed markets (more
intermediation) yield less expected revenue per order.
makers. This suggests that more developed markets are more sensitive to
taxation and may yield lower expected revenue per order.
4.12. Positive-Feedback Traders. One idea mentioned earlier was that
a transaction tax might reduce distortions created by “destabilizing spec-
ulators.” While there could be many formulations for such an idea, we
investigate the positive-feedback traders of De Long et al. (1990). In that
work, destabilizing speculators impart “positive feedback” to the market; in
other words, they mimic the trade that preceded them. This pushes markets
further from equilibrium and should yield a loss in allocative efficiency.
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% Market Makers 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Rev.-optimal Tax (bp) 69 67 64 62 59 57
Revenue/order (bp) 23 21 19 18 16 14
Optimal Spread (bp) 305 298 287 280 269 262
vs untaxed +377% +326% +281% +249% +219% +199%
Effective Spread (bp) 292 285 274 267 257 250
vs untaxed +296% +271% +249% +237% +223% +215%
Fill Rate 34% 32% 30% 28% 27% 24%
vs untaxed -55% -56% -56% -57% -56% -56%
E(Quote Revenue) $ 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.024
vs untaxed -65% -67% -68% -68% -67% -67%
Realized Volatility $ 0.260 0.259 0.256 0.253 0.247 0.244
vs untaxed +34% +46% +60% +79% +99% +128%
Gains from Trade $/k 97.71 91.78 88.01 83.86 77.30 70.15
vs untaxed -71% -71% -69% -68% -66% -65%
Deadweight Loss $/k 147.5 136.1 119.8 104.1 88.8 73.6
Table 2. Measures of market quality for revenue-optimal
transaction tax rates. Investors have private reserve values
for the asset with a mean of $20 and volatility of 2.5%; market
makers have reserve values equal to the average of $20. Gains
from trade and deadweight loss are displayed in dollars per
1000 orders.
In our constant-asset-value setup, this is equivalent to having traders
whose reservation value depends in part on the reservation value of the
trader preceding them. We structure this as an AR(1) process to maintain
covariance stationarity. The dynamics would thus look like this:
(31) dt|dt−1 iid∼ f =

0 w.p. µ
N
(
0, L2
(
1 + λγ
2
1−γ2
))
w.p. 1− µ.
Therefore, the preceding results still hold: Even in the presence of positive-
feedback traders, we can expect a tax to widen spreads and increase volatil-
ity. Intuitively, this makes sense: positive-feedback traders take more ex-
treme views than normal (non-positive-feedback) investors; therefore, they
are less likely to be dissuaded from trading by a comparatively-small tax.
36 D. W. R. ROSENTHAL, N. D. M. THOMAS, AND H. WANG
In comparison, normal investors are more likely to be dissuaded by such
a tax and, thus, the influence of positive-feedback traders is likely to be
proportionally greater with a tax.
For intuition, we appeal to the idea of taxing alcohol: The tax does little to
change the drinking habits of alcoholics but does dissuade moderate drinkers.
One problem with this analogy is that moderate drinkers can switch to being
alcoholics, and so a tax dissuading moderate drinkers from imbibing might
still have social benefit. Here, however, we believe there is no danger of
addiction. Therefore, a transactions tax would seem to be welfare-reducing
since it does nothing to reduce the externalities of positive-feedback traders.
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Figure 13. Dispersion of reservation prices for investors
who are price takers for 100,000 simulated traders. Curves
show 10% increments of market makers, from none to half of
arriving traders. Traders have a reservation value offset of 0
(market makers) or with volatility of 2.5% (investors). Note
that taxes increase the dispersion of investors who trade —
by chasing away investors with less extreme views. The plot
for investors who are price makers (i.e. who quote) is the
same.
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5. Conclusion
Following the recent financial crisis, regulators have tried to assure the
public that such a crisis would not recur, that those responsible would be
penalized, and that the financial industry would pay for being bailed out.
Some policy makers have proposed a securities transaction tax to meet these
goals with the idea that a tax would reduce price volatility; encourage long-
term investing; raise large amounts of revenue from a very small tax; and,
push harmful speculators out of the market. At the time of this writing,
European politicians are the most vocal proponents of a Europe/Eurozone
financial transaction tax.23 Many of their speeches cite these very goals for
the implementation of a tax.
Opponents of transaction taxes, however, have argued that a transac-
tion tax will reduce liquidity and increase trading costs making trading too
expensive for some investors. They have also said a tax such as the broad-
based one proposed by DeFazio will be difficult to implement (especially
across asset classes); will distort the market by reducing market efficiency;
and, will push traders to other venues or countries.
Policy makers cannot easily experiment with their markets; and, it is
not clear how informative empirical studies are to proposed taxes on other
markets. We developed this model to guide policy makers and to help aca-
demics understand how different aspects of market quality may be related
or affected by a tax. The resulting sequential trader model is very clean in
its assumptions — a contribution to the market microstructure literature
23Peel (2010) notes that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is “pushing for a Europe-wide
financial transaction tax by 2012” which she expects to raise “an extra e2B per year for
the German budget.” In France, Wall Street Journal (2012) quotes President Franc¸oise
Hollande saying he will “put production before speculation, investment before immediate
gratification” and notes that his government doubled France’s proposed tax to 20 bp.
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in its own right. However, the model also has much to say about the ef-
fects of intermediation in thin/fast markets as well as the effects of financial
transaction taxes.
What the model suggests should give pause to the hasty imposition of
transaction taxes. We find the tax increases the effects of destabilizing
speculators; it does not chase them out of the market. We also find that
optimal and effective spreads widen; volatility may slightly decrease (while
other metrics get much worse) or, more often, increases greatly; and, both
the benefits of providing liquidity and gains from trade decrease. All of these
effects are strong enough to be highly economically significant. Depending
on their urgency, investors trading in this lower liquidity environment might
be subject to higher adverse selection. Any one of these effects could be
harmful; in concert, they could hobble traders with genuine needs to trade.
In particular, we suspect the effects will be borne disproportionately by
retail traders and others lacking superior information. These changes in the
secondary market would likely reduce the ability of companies to raise funds
in the primary market; thus a tax could reduce job and wealth creation.
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the revenue-optimal tax would be
very high, between 55 bp and 70 bp. These rates would be very harmful to
market quality.
Because the model is one of sequential traders, it assumes potential traders
come to the market, make one small trade, and then leave. Thus the model
is especially applicable to markets where there are close substitutes (e.g. in-
vestors who buy a small amount of the cheapest corporate bond meeting
certain criteria) or where liquidity is thin (inside bid-ask quotes are of small
size). As many have noted, and Black (1971) predicted, this includes mar-
kets where high-frequency trading is prevalent since those markets can be
effectively thin. In thin markets, market makers can reduce liquidity for
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other traders if they compete to trade. This would be particularly relevant
for high-frequency traders who are not only intermediaries but also engage in
proprietary trading. Since this describes a large portion of current securities
markets, we believe this analysis is important for policy makers considering
implementing a financial transaction tax.
While not our primary goal, the model also yields information about the
effects of intermediation in thin/fast markets. Increasing the proportion of
actors who are market makers may increase optimal bid-ask spreads while
having little effect on effective (realized) spreads. This may help disentangle
seemingly conflicting findings between these two measures of liquidity. In-
creasing the fraction of market makers reduces volume and gains from trade
overall, increases the gains from trade for investors, and may increase or de-
crease the value of quoting. The strongest effect of increasing the prevalence
of market makers is a large reduction in the realized volatility. While some
of these could be viewed negatively, taken together they likely reflect that
markets are more efficient and thus there are fewer opportunities to make
outsized profits.
Increasing the fraction of market makers causes markets to be more sen-
sitive to transaction taxes. Under a tax, volatility increases much faster
that of a market lacking intermediaries. Volume also drops by a greater
fraction as do the benefits of providing liquidity and gains from trade. Thus
markets with high levels of intermediation may respond differently to a tax
than markets with little or no intermediation. This is crucial for policy
makers because it suggests that the findings of empirical studies may not be
applicable to markets with differing levels of intermediation.
Finally, there are many issues which have been left for further work. For
example, we do not address the effects of quote taxes (recently implemented
in France). However, we believe that prior theory (by one of the co-authors)
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will help us conduct a similar study of those effects. Taken with the work
here, that would then allow us to examine the French policy to tease apart
the effects of the two taxes. We also suspect this would help us determine
the fraction of people somehow escaping the tax as well as the propensity
of traders to leave for other (less taxed) markets.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Clear Course of Action.
Proof of Proposition 1. In Table 1, Rick takes Ilsa’s prices if dt+1 < −R0∗Q −
δ − 2τ or dt+1 > R0∗Q + β + 2τ . Suppose both could be satisfied. Then we
would have that:
R0∗Q + β + 2τ < −R0∗Q − δ − 2τ, which implies(32)
β + δ < −2R0∗Q − 4τ.(33)
Since R0∗Q and τ are non-negative, this implies a negative bid-ask spread —
and we have a contradiction. 
A.2. Characterizing the Bid-Ask Spread.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the case for dt > 0; the case for dt < 0
proceeds similarly.
Suppose δ ≥ β. The optimal revenue is given by:
(34) RQ = ρF (−R0∗Q −δ−2τ)(δ+dt−2τ)+ρF (−R0∗Q −β−2τ)(β−dt−2τ).
We define a sub-optimal revenue R′Q by switching δ and β:
(35) R′Q = ρF (−R0∗Q −β−2τ)(β+dt−2τ)+ρF (−R0∗Q −δ−2τ)(δ−dt−2τ).
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Since RQ is optimal, we have that RQ −R′Q > 0. However,
(36) RQ −R′Q = ρ2dt
(
F (−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ)− F (−R0∗Q − β − 2τ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
is negative by the properties of a cdf. This implies RQ < R
′
Q and that δ and
β are not optimal — a contradiction.
Finally, if dt = 0, the optimal revenue is given by:
(37) RQ = ρF (−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ)(δ − 2τ) + ρF (−R0∗Q − β − 2τ)(β − 2τ).
These two summands must have the same maximizer, so δ = β. 
Proof of Proposition 3. DefineH(x) = F (G(x))/f(G(x)), then we can rewrite
the equilibrium δ and β as,
δ = H(δ)− dt + 2τ,(38)
β = H(β) + dt + 2τ, and thus,(39)
δ + β = H(δ) +H(β) + 4τ ≥ 4τ.(40)
Since we assumed τ/share tax is collected at both position entry and exit (a
total of 2τ), the bid-ask spread δ+β is more than twice the tax collected. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We first note that
δ + β =
F (G(δ))
f(G(δ))
+
F (G(β))
f(G(β))
+ 4τ.(41)
Since f is symmetric about 0, F (x) = 1 − F (−x), letting us rewrite the
above. Since dt ∼ F have Var(dt) = L2 <∞, we may apply the Chebyshev
inequality:
δ + β =
1− F (−G(δ))
f(G(δ))
+
1− F (−G(β))
f(G(β))
+ 4τ(42)
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≤ L
2
2G(δ)2f(G(δ))
+
L2
2G(β)2f(G(β))
+ 4τ(43)
with the factor of 2 arising from the symmetry of f . 
A.3. Quoting Benefit is Positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. Rearranging the terms for RQ|dt, we have
RQ|dt = ρF (G(δ)(δ + dt − 2τ) + ρF (G(β))(β − dt − 2τ)(44)
= ρ[(F (G(δ))− F (G(β))]dt+
ρF (G(δ))(δ − 2τ) + ρF (G(β))(β − 2τ).
(45)
We prove the case for dt > 0; the case for dt < 0 proceeds similarly. If
dt > 0, we have β > δ from Proposition 2. Therefore, we have G(δ) > G(β)
and F (G(δ)) > F (G(β)), as G(·) is a decreasing function and F (·) is an
increasing function by definition.
It follows that,
F (G(δ))(δ − 2τ) + F (G(β))(β − 2τ)(46)
> F (G(β))(δ − 2τ) + F (G(β))(β − 2τ)(47)
= F (G(β))(δ + β − 4τ) > 0(48)
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 3 
A.4. Existence of Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6. We handle two cases together (with qualifications
as needed) for both a pdf f with finite support on [−L,L] and for f with
support over the entire real line. The pdf with finite support is defined so
that f(x) = 0 ∀ x ∈ R\[−L,L].
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Rewrite the expected quote profit RQ|dt as,
RQ|dt ≡ ρw(δ, β) = ρw1(δ) + ρw2(β) where(49)
w1(δ) = F (G(δ))(δ + dt − 2τ), and(50)
w2(β) = F (G(β))(β − dt − 2τ).(51)
Holding R0∗Q , τ , and dt fixed, we have that
lim
δ→−∞
F (G(δ))(δ + dt − 2τ) = −∞; and,(52)
lim
δ→∞
F (G(δ))(δ + dt − 2τ) = lim
δ→∞
F (−δ)δ = − lim
δ→−∞
F (δ)δ = 0(53)
with the last equality justified by finite variance: Var(x) < ∞ implies the
cdf converges to 0 faster than x.
We then note that δ + dt − 2τ > 0 implies δ > 2τ − dt, in which case:
(54) w1(δ) = F (G(δ))(δ + dt − 2τ) > 0.
If f has only finite support, then G(δ) > −L and G(β) > −L imply lower
bounds δ, β < L−RQ−2τ . From these bounds, we can show that w1(δ) > 0
iff dt > RQ + 4τ − L and w2(β) > 0 iff dt < L − RQ − 4τ ; w1 and w2 are
otherwise 0. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that if RQ + 4τ − L ≥ L then
@ δ s.t. w1(δ) > 0 and, similarly, that if L−RQ− 4τ −L ≤ −L then @β s.t.
w2(β) > 0.
Therefore, since R0∗Q and τ are bounded, we have that:
max
δ
w1(δ) = max
δ
F (G(δ))(δ + dt − 2τ) = F (G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ)(55)
for some δM > 2τ − dt. We can also show likewise for w2(β): That there
exists a maximizing βM > 2τ + dt.
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Therefore, we have that
(56) max
δ,β
(w1(δ) + w2(β)) = w1(δM ) + w2(βM ) > 0.
Since we attain a bounded maximum at some δM , βM for all dt over the
support of the distribution, there is an expected best strategy and thus a
Markov Perfect equilibrium exists. 
A.5. Uniqueness of Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. Continuing with the notation in the preceding proof,
we find the optimal δM and βM by differentiating w1 and w2. This gives us
our first-order conditions:
∂w1
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=δM
= −f(G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ) + F (G(δM )) = 0(57)
∂w2
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=βM
= −f(G(βM ))(βM − dt − 2τ) + F (G(βM )) = 0.(58)
The equilibrium expected quote revenue, R0∗Q , is then given by
(59) R0∗Q = E(RQ|dt) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(w1(δM ) + w2(βM ))dF (dt).
Since F is continuous, the pdf f is dominated by some function and
Fatou’s Lemma allows us to interchange integration and limit operations.
This lets us differentiate under the integral sign, yielding
(60)
∂R0∗Q
RQ
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
∂w1(δM )
∂RQ
+
∂w2(βM )
∂RQ
)
dF (dt)
for all R0∗Q ∈ [0,∞).
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Differentiating w1 and w2 with respect to RQ, we get
∂w1(δM )
∂RQ
=
=0 by FOC in (57)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(F (G(δM ))− f(G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ)) ∂δM
∂RQ
− f(G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ),
(61)
∂w2(βM )
∂RQ
=
=0 by FOC in (58)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(F (G(βM ))− f(G(βM ))(βM − dt − 2τ)) ∂βM
∂RQ
− f(G(βM ))(βM − dt − 2τ).
(62)
The first-order conditions on w1 and w2 then reduce these to
∂w1(δM )
∂RQ
= −f(G(δM ))(δM + dt − 2τ) < 0,(63)
∂w2(βM )
∂RQ
= −f(G(βM )(βM − dt − 2τ) < 0.(64)
Combining these and invoking the continuity of F , we then have that
R0∗Q (RQ) is a strictly decreasing continuous function. Therefore, for all ρ ∈
(0, 1], there must be a unique R∗Q such that R
0∗
Q (R
∗
Q) = R
∗
Q/ρ. Thus the
Markov Perfect equilibrium is unique. 
Appendix B. Solution of the Uniform Case
Using δ and β from equation (6), an interior solution requires that
R0∗Q + δ + 2τ ∈ [−L,L] ⇐⇒ −L+R0∗Q + 4τ ≤ dt ≤ 3L+R0∗Q + 4τ,(65)
R0∗Q + β + 2τ ∈ [−L,L] ⇐⇒ −3L−R0∗Q − 4τ ≤ dt ≤ L−R0∗Q − 4τ.(66)
Both the δ and the β result imply that
(67) L−R0∗Q − 4τ > −L ⇐⇒ R0∗Q < 2L− 4τ.
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We can then compute the expected RQ|dt:
R0∗Q
ρ
= E(RQ|dT )(68)
=
∫ L
−L+R0∗Q +4τ (δ + dt − 2τ)
2ddt +
∫ L−R0∗Q −4τ
−L (β + dt − 2τ)2ddt
4L2
(69)
= (dt −R0∗Q + L− 4τ)3/(3 · 16L2)
∣∣L
−L+R0∗Q +4τ
+ (dt +R
0∗
Q − L+ 4τ)3/(3 · 16L2)
∣∣L−R0∗Q −4τ
−L
(70)
= (2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)3/(24L2).(71)
Appendix C. Solution of Uniform with Market Makers Case
Using the definitions in equations (15)–(18), we first prove a number of
lemmas necessary for the main result.
Lemma 1. maxδ V1(δ) ≥ 0 and maxβ V2(β) ≥ 0.
Proof. By the nature of CDFs and indicator functions, we know that
(1− µ)F (G(δ)) + µI(G(δ)) ≥ 0 and(72)
(1− µ)F (G(β)) + µI(G(β)) ≥ 0.(73)
For any δ, β > 2τ−dt, δ+dt−2τ > 0 and β−dt−2τ > 0. Since V1 and V2
are products of non-negative entities, they are themselves non-negative. 
Lemma 2. maxδ V1(δ) > 0 iff dt ∈ (R0∗Q + 4τ − L,L].
Proof. “⇐= ” Since dt > R0∗Q +4τ −L, we have 2τ −dt < L−R0∗Q −2τ . For
any δ ∈ (2τ − dt, L − R0∗Q − 2τ), we have: δ > 2τ − dt, i.e. δ + dt − 2τ > 0
and δ < L−R0∗Q −2τ , i.e. G(δ) = −R0∗Q − δ−2τ > −L. Therefore, we know
that F (G(δ)) > 0 and (1− µ)F (G(δ)) + µI(G(δ)) > 0. Thus V1(δ) > 0 and
so maxδ V1(δ) > 0.
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“ =⇒ ” maxδ V1(δ) > 0 implies that ∃ δ s.t. V1(δ) > 0. Hence G(δ) > −L
and δ + dt − 2τ > 0. Therefore, 2τ − dt < δ < L − R0∗Q − 2τ which implies
that dt > R
0∗
Q + 4τ − L. 
Lemma 3. maxβ V2(β) > 0 iff dt ∈ [−L,L−R0∗Q − 4τ).
Proof. The proof proceeds as that for Lemma 2. 
Lemma 4. For all δ ∈ R, β ∈ R, dt ∈ R, µ ∈ (0, 1], R0∗Q > 0, and τ ≥ 0:
(74)
∂2V1(δ)
∂δ2
≤ 0, and ∂
2V2(β)
∂β2
≤ 0.
Proof. By inspection of equations (22) and (23). 
Corollary 3. For dt ∈ (R0∗Q + 4τ −L,L], if δ ≤ −R0∗Q −2τ , then ∂V1(δ)∂δ > 0.
For dt ∈ [−L,L−R0∗Q − 4τ), if β ≤ −R0∗Q − 2τ , then ∂V2(β)∂β > 0.
Proof. Let δ0 = −R0∗Q − 2τ and β0 = −R0∗Q − 2τ . For δ ≤ δ0:
∂V1(δ)
∂δ
≥ ∂V1(δ)
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ0
=
1− µ
2L
(−L−R0∗Q − 2δ0 − dt +
2L
1− µ)(75)
=
1− µ
2L
(R0∗Q + 4τ − L− dt) + 1(76)
>
1− µ
2L
(0− 2L) + 1 = −(1− µ) + 1 = µ > 0.(77)
Similarly, for β ≤ β0 ∂V2(β)∂β ≥ ∂V2(β)∂β
∣∣∣
β=β0
> 0. 
Corollary 4. There exists a unique δM > δ0 such that:
∂V1(δ)
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=δM
= 0 where δM =
1
2
(L−R0∗Q − dt)(78)
for dt ∈ (R0∗Q + 4τ − L,L]. There also exists a unique βM > β0 such that:
∂V2(β)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=βM
= 0 where βM =
1
2
(L−R0∗Q − dt)(79)
for dt ∈ [−L,L−R0∗Q − 4τ).
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Lemma 5. If 4τ ≥ L, then V1(δ0) ≤ 0 and V2(β0) ≤ 0.
Proof. If 4τ ≥ L, then
V1(δ0) = [(1− µ)F (G(δ0)) + µI(G(δ0) ≥ 0)](δ0 + dt − 2τ)(80)
=
1 + µ
2
(−R0∗Q + dt − 4τ) ≤
1 + µ
2
(−R0∗Q ) ≤ 0(81)
since dt ≤ L. Likewise
V2(β0) = [(1− µ)F (G(β0)) + µI(G(β0) ≥ 0)](β0 − dt − 2τ) ≤ 0(82)
since dt ≥ −L. 
Lemma 6. If 4τ < L and R0∗Q < L− 4τ , then V1(δ0) > 0 and V2(β0) > 0.
Proof. Under the assumptions,
δ0 + dt − 2τ = −R0∗Q − 4τ + dt > 0 ⇐⇒ dt > R0∗Q + 4τ,(83)
β0 − dt − 2τ = −R0∗Q − 4τ − dt > 0 ⇐⇒ dt < −R0∗Q − 4τ.(84)
Since (1−µ)F (G(δ)) +µI(G(δ) ≥ 0) > 0 also, V1(δ) > 0 and V2(β) > 0. 
Corollary 5. If 4τ < L and R0∗Q ≥ L− 4τ , then V1(δ0) and V2(β0) may be
positive or negative, depending on dt.
Lemma 7. If 0 ≤ τ < µL√
2µ+2µ2+2µ
and R0∗Q ≤ 4µL√2µ+2µ2+2µ − 4τ , then:
(1) For any dt ∈ (x1 +R0∗Q + 4τ, L], maxδ V1(δ) = V1(δ0); and,
(2) For any dt ∈ [−L,−x1 −R0∗Q − 4τ), maxβ V2(β) = V2(β0)
where x1 =
1+3µ
1−µ L−
2
√
2µ+2µ2
1−µ L.
Proof.
V1(δ0) > V1(δM ) ⇐⇒(85)
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1 + µ
2
(−R0∗Q − 4τ + dt)−
1− µ
8L
(L−R0∗Q − 4τ + dt)2 > 0,(86)
V2(β0) > V2(βM ) ⇐⇒(87)
1 + µ
2
(−R0∗Q − 4τ − dt)−
1− µ
8L
(L−R0∗Q − 4τ − dt)2 > 0.(88)
For dt ∈ (R0∗Q + 4τ, L], let x = dt −R0∗Q − 4τ . Then equation (86) ⇐⇒
1 + µ
2
x− 1− µ
8L
(L+ x)2 > 0(89)
⇐⇒ (1− µ)x2 − 2L(1 + 3µ)x+ (1− µ)L2 < 0.(90)
By the quadratic formula, we define:
x1 =
1 + 3µ
1− µ L−
2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
1− µ L, x2 =
1 + 3µ
1− µ L+
2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
1− µ L.(91)
Equation (90) holds iff x1 < x < x2 and, in that case, x1 < L < x2. (An
aside: If µ = 0, x1 = x2 = x = L and equation (86) cannot hold.)
Since dt ≤ L, x ≤ L−R0∗Q − 4τ ; if x1 > L−R0∗Q − 4τ , then dt > L which
is not possible — so equation (86) cannot be satisfied. Thus we require
L−R0∗Q − 4τ ≥ x1 ⇐⇒ L− x1 ≥ R0∗Q + 4τ(92)
⇐⇒ 2L
1− µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 − 2µ) ≥ R0∗Q + 4τ(93)
⇐⇒ R0∗Q + 4τ ≤
4µL√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ
.(94)
Similarly, for equation (88) to hold, we require that
R0∗Q + 4τ ≤
4µL√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ
. 
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Proof of Proposition 8. First consider the case 2µL√
2µ+2µ2+2µ
≤ 2τ < L. As-
sume that R0∗Q ∈ (0, 2L− 4τ). From Lemmas 2 and 3,
E(RQ|dt)
ρ
=
1− µ
48L2
(dt +R
0∗
Q + 4τ − L)3
∣∣∣∣L−R0∗Q −4τ
−L
+
1− µ
48L2
(dt −R0∗Q − 4τ + L)3
∣∣∣∣L
R0∗Q +4τ−L
(95)
=
1− µ
24L2
(2L−R0∗Q − 4τ)3.(96)
Since this is a decreasing cubic with a triple root at R0∗Q = 2L − 4τ , it
decreases to 0 on R0∗Q ∈ (0, 2L−4τ), implying there is a unique equilibrium.
Now consider the case 0 ≤ τ < µL√
2µ+2µ2+2µ
. Assume R0∗Q ∈ (0, L+ 2L1+µ −
4τ ] and recall x1 =
1+3µ−2
√
2µ+2µ2
1−µ L. From Lemmas 2, 3, and 7,
E(RQ|dt)
ρ
= −1 + µ
8L
(dt +R
0∗
Q + 4τ)
2
∣∣∣∣−x1−R0∗Q −4τ
−L
+
1− µ
48L2
(dt +R
0∗
Q + 4τ − L)3
∣∣∣∣L−R0∗Q −4τ
−x1−R0∗Q −4τ
+
1− µ
48L2
(dt + L−R0∗Q − 4τ)3
∣∣∣∣x1+R0∗Q +4τ
R0∗Q +4τ−L
+
1 + µ
8L
(dt −R0∗Q − 4τ)2
∣∣∣∣L
x1+R0∗Q +4τ
(97)
=
6(1 + µ)L((L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2 − x21) + (1− µ)(L+ x1)3
24L2
(98)
=
(1 + µ)(3(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2 − 3x21 + 2x1(L+ x1))
12L
(99)
=
(1 + µ)(3(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2 + 2x1L− x21)
12L
> 0.(100)
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where equation (89) equalling zero for x = x1 yields the penultimate step
and x1 ≤ L yields the last step. Note that
E(RQ|dt)|R0∗Q =0
ρ
=
1 + µ
12L
(3(L− 4τ)2 + x1(2L− x1)) > 0(101)
since 0 < x1 < L and 4τ < L. Now consider the difference ∆ between
E(RQ|dt) and R0∗Q to see if a fixed point exists:
∆(R0∗Q ) =
E(RQ|dt)|R0∗Q
ρ
− R
0∗
Q
ρ
;(102)
1
ρ
∂∆(R0∗Q )
∂R0∗Q
=
1 + µ
12L
6(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)(−1)− 1 = 0(103)
Since ∂∆
∂R0∗Q
< 0 on R0∗Q ∈ (0, L + 2L1+µ − 4τ), this implies ∆ is minimized at
R0∗Q = L+
2L
1+µ − 4τ . For any ρ ∈ (0, 1]:
∃ a solution R
0∗
Q
ρ
=
E(R0∗Q )
ρ
on R0∗Q ∈ (0, L+
2L
1 + µ
− 4τ ](104)
⇐⇒ ∆(R0∗Q )
∣∣
L+ 2L
1+µ
−4τ = [E(R
0∗
Q )−R0∗Q ]
∣∣
L+ 2L
1+µ
−4τ < 0(105)
⇐⇒ 1 + µ
12L
(
3
(
2L
1 + µ
)2
+ 2x1L− x21
)
− L
ρ
− 2L/ρ
1 + µ
+
4τ
ρ
< 0.(106)
We next examine
∆(R0∗Q )
ρ
∣∣∣∣
L+ 2L
1+µ
−4τ
to see if the last inequality holds:
1 + µ
12L
(
3
(
2L
1 + µ
)2
+ 2x1L− x21
)
− L
ρ
− 2L/ρ
1 + µ
+
4τ
ρ
(107)
=
L
1 + µ
+
(1− µ)x1
6
− (1 + µ)x
2
1
12L
− L
ρ
− 2L/ρ
1 + µ
+
4τ
ρ
(108)
= −L
ρ
(
1 +
2− ρ
1 + µ
)
+
(1 + µ)x1
6
(
1− x1
2L
)
+
4τ
ρ
(109)
<
4τ − L
ρ
− L
1 + µ
+
(1 + µ)x1
6
< 4τ − L− L
1 + µ
+
1 + µ
6
L(110)
< 4τ − L︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+L
(
−1
2
+
1
3
)
< 0.(111)
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Thus there is a unique solution. 
Lemma 8. For µ0 ≤ µ ≤ 1,
∂Z1(µ)
∂µ
< 0 where(112)
Z1(µ) = α
2(µ)
( √
2µ+ 2µ2
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)
+ 1
)
and(113)
µ0 =
2τ2
(L− 2τ)2 − 2τ2 .(114)
Proof.
∂
∂µ
[
α2(µ)
[
1 +
1
µ
− 2√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ
]]
(115)
=
2α(µ)4µ
(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
1 + 1µ − 2√2µ+2µ2+2µ√
2µ+ 2µ2
+ α2(µ)
 2+4µ√2µ+2µ2 + 4
(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
− 1
µ2
(116)
=
α(µ)√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ
[
8(1 + µ)
(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)
√
2µ+ 2µ2
− 4
µ
− 8µ− 16µ
2
(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
+
16µ
(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
](117)
=
α2(µ)
4µ
[
8(1 + µ)µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)− 8µ2 + 16µ3
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
− 4(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 16µ2 +
√
2µ+ 2µ2
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
](118)
=
α2(µ)
16µ
[
2µ
√
2µ+ 2µ2 − 4µ2 + 2µ2
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 8µ3
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
− 2µ
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ2
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 4µ(2µ+ 2µ2)
µ(
√
2µ+ 2µ2 + 2µ)2
√
2µ+ 2µ2
](119)
= −12µ2 < 0 ∀ µ > 0.(120)
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
Proof of Proposition 9.
E(RQ|dt)
ρ
=
R0∗Q
ρ
(121)
⇐⇒ 1 + µ
12L
[
3(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2 + L2 − α2(µ)L2
]
=
R0∗Q
ρ
.(122)
Differentiating both sides wrt µ yields
1
12L
[
3(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)2 + L2 − α2(µ)L2
]
+
1 + µ
12L
[
6(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)
(
−∂R
0∗
Q
∂µ
)
− 2α(µ)∂α(µ)
∂µ
L2
]
=
∂R0∗Q
ρ∂µ
(123)
⇐⇒
(
1
ρ
+
1 + µ
2L
(L−R0∗Q − 4τ)
)
∂R0∗Q
∂µ
(124)
=
L
[
3
(
1− R
0∗
Q +4τ
L
)2
+ 1− α2(µ)− 2(1 + µ)α(µ)∂α(µ)∂µ
]
12
(125)
=
L
[
3
(
1− R
0∗
Q +4τ
L
)2
+ 1− α2(µ)
( √
2µ+2µ2
µ(
√
2µ+2µ2+2µ)
+ 1
)]
12
.(126)
Now we note that final term of this (involving α2(µ) is the same as Z1(µ)
from Lemma 8. Since ∂Z1(µ)∂µ < 0 for µ0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, we then note that
Z1(µ0) ≥ Z1(µ) ≥ Z1(1) = 32 where Z(µ0) = 4τL . Then
Z1(µ0) = α
2(µ0)
 1
µ0(1 +
2√
2/µ0+2
)
+ 1
(127)
=
16τ2
L2
(L− 2τ)2 − 2τ2
2τ2
(
1 + 2τL−2τ
) + 1
(128)
= 8
(
1− 6 τ
L
+ 12
( τ
L
)2 − 4( τ
L
)3)
(129)
makes it easy to see that 32 ≤ Z1(µ0) ≤ 8.
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Note that 3
(
1− R
0∗
Q −4τ
L
)2
+ 1 ∈ (1, 4). Also note that R0∗Q depends on
both µ and ρ. In particular, when ρ is small enough, R0∗Q is very close to
zero. Therefore, the sign of
∂R0∗Q
∂µ is not the same for all µ (i.e. there is no
uniform conclusion). 
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is simple: Note that
(130) Z(µ) < 3
(
1√
6
)2
+ 1− Z1(1) = 3
2
− 3
2
= 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.
(131) R0∗Q + 4τ <
(
1− 1√
6
L
)
=⇒ 3
(
1− R
0∗
Q + 4τ
L
)
+ 1 >
3
2
Since minµ Z1(µ) = Z1(1) =
3
2 , when µ is close to 1:
(132) Z1(µ) < 3
(
1− R
0∗
Q + 4τ
L
)
+ 1.
Appendix D. Solution of Normal with Market Makers Case
Lemma 9. The function f(x) = (x+ c)(1−Φ(ax+ b)) + d for a > 0 has a
unique global maximum on R.
Proof.
∂f
∂x
= −a(x+ c)φ(ax+ b) + 1− Φ(ax+ b)(133)
∂2f
∂x2
= φ(ax+ b)(−a+ a2(x+ c)(ax+ b)− a)(134)
= aφ(ax+ b)(−2 + a2x2 + a(b+ ac)x+ abc).(135)
∂2f
∂x2
has roots at
x0 =
−ab− a2c±√a2(b+ ac)2 − 4a2(abc− 2)
2a2
(136)
=
−b
2a
− c
2
±
√
(b− ac)2 + 8
2a
.(137)
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The two roots are real (one positive, one negative) since the interior of the
square root is positive. For x < c, f is negative; for x > c, f is positive.
However, for x greater than the largest root x > −b2a − c2 +
√
(b−ac)2+8
2a ,
∂f
∂x < 0
and ∂
2f
∂x2
> 0. Thus f descends to an asymptote. Since f is continuous
and ∂
2f
∂x2
< 0 for x between the two roots, f attains a global maximum on
(−b−ac2a −
a
√
(b−ac)2+8
2a2
, −b−ac2a +
a
√
(b−ac)2+8
2a2
). 
Proof of Proposition 10. Since RQ|dt contains two indicator functions, we
consider three regions: where neither is active, where the first indicator is
active, and where the second indicator is active. By Proposition 1, we know
the indicator functions are never both active.
By Lemma 9, we can find a global maximum on an unconstrained interval.
We find maxima for each constrained interval and thus the max of RQ|dt
over the three regions. We then compute the expected value of RQ|dt over
the dt distribution (common knowledge), yielding E(RQ|dt) = R0∗Q . Since
the maximum is unique, we have a unique Markov Perfect equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 11. If the distribution of reservation values F is Gauss-
ian, then the bid-ask spread is given by
(138) δ + β =
Φ((−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ)/L)
φ((−R0∗Q − δ − 2τ)/L)
+
Φ((−R0∗Q − β − 2τ)/L)
φ((−R0∗Q − β − 2τ)/L)
+ 4τ.
From Lemma 2 in Feller I (p. 175), we get that:
(139) δ + β ≤ L|R0∗Q + δ + 2τ |
+
L
|R0∗Q + β + 2τ |
+ 4τ.
Using Jensen’s inequality, we get
δ + β ≤ 2L
2R0∗Q + δ + β + 4τ
+ 4τ ≤ L
R0∗Q + 4τ
+ 4τ. 
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